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In this paper I address the question: How is it that people come to choose mathematics and in what 
ways is this process gendered? I draw on the findings of a qualitative research study involving 
interviews with 43 young people all studying mathematics in post-compulsory education in 
England. Working within a post-structuralist framework, I argue that gender is a project and one 
that is achieved in interaction with others. Through a detailed reading of Toni and Claudia‘s stories I 
explore the tensions for young women who are engaging in mathematics, something that is 
discursively inscribed as masculine, while (understandably) being invested in producing themselves 
as female. I conclude by arguing that seeing ‗doing mathematics‘ as ‗doing masculinity‘ is a 
productive way of understanding why mathematics is so male dominated and by looking at the 
implications of this understanding for gender and mathematics reform work. 
 Introduction 
In England, the evolving gendered patterns of attainment in mathematics need to be juxtaposed with 
the unchanging gendered patterns of participation in the subject. There are few remaining 
differences between the attainment of males and females in either GCSE-level, AS-level, or A-level 
mathematics (taken at ages 16+, 17+ and 18+, respectively) (Gorard et al., 2001; The Guardian, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b). Although boys remain more likely to secure the top grades, the 
differences are small and getting smaller. In contrast to these shifting patterns of attainment, the 
decision to continue with advanced mathematics remains highly gendered. This polarisation persists 
despite decades of feminist intervention; as Shaw (1995, p. 107) says, ‗the most striking feature of 
subject choice is that the freer it is, the more gendered it is‘. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, from 1994 
to 2003 the proportion of the total number of 17 and 18 year olds entered for A-level mathematics 
in England who are male changed little, dropping only slightly from 65% to 63% (Government 
Statistical Service, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002; The Guardian, 2002b, 2003b). 
This greater participation of males in mathematics courses becomes more pronounced as you 
progress through the levels—AS-level, A-level, undergraduate, and then postgraduate—and is 
reflected in the larger number of men than women working in mathematically oriented fields. There 
is a similar pattern of gendered participation in mathematical activities in other countries (Hanna, 
1996; Boaler, 2000; Blattel-Mink, 2002). 
Mathematics is a powerful subject, a signifier of intelligence that acts as a ‗critical filter‘ (Sells, 
1980) controlling entry to high-status areas of academia and employment. Thus, for those 
concerned with social justice, it is pertinent to ask: How is it that people come to choose 
mathematics and in what ways is this process gendered? This is the question that I address in this 
paper. 
I do this by analysing two interviews drawn from a larger study that involves interviews and 
observations of 43 young Londoners who have chosen to continue studying mathematics beyond 
the end of compulsory education. In the interviews students were asked to describe a typical 
mathematics lesson, about what they had enjoyed most and least about mathematics, for their 
feelings on different teaching styles, to compare mathematics with other subjects, to explain their 
subject choices and their future plans, and for their feelings on gender. I analysed these interviews 
as narratives-of-self and then developed connections between them, dividing the participants into 
five groups by their main reason for choosing mathematics: ‗for enjoyment‘, ‗for chosen career and 
for enjoyment‘, ‗for chosen career and NOT for enjoyment‘, ‗to prove something to others‘ and ‗to 
prove something to themselves‘. In an earlier paper (Mendick, 2003) I told stories of three of the 
male participants who were using mathematics ‗to prove something to others‘. Simon chose 
mathematics, in spite of the way its curriculum violates his notions of ‗commonsense‘, in order to 
prove his worth to potential employers; James also chose mathematics as a way of securing his 
future within the labour market; Michael chose mathematics in order to use its reputation as a hard 
subject to prove his intelligence to those around him. I argued, using work on school masculinities 
(for example, Connell, 1989; Mac an Ghaill, 1994), that, in choosing mathematics, these boys were 
doing masculinity. 
 Figure 1. Participation in A-level mathematics by gender  
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Note: in the published paper the graph goes to 2003 – there‘s little change 
This paper is an exploration of the possibilities of applying this idea, that doing mathematics is 
doing masculinity, to the girls in my study. I develop my argument using detailed readings of the 
stories of two participants, Toni and Claudia. Toni is in the same group (‗to prove something to 
others‘) as Simon, James and Michael, and the similarities and differences between her story and 
those others are central to my exploration of how performances of masculinity, such as doing 
mathematics, affect and are affected by one‘s daily existence as a woman. Claudia‘s group (‗to 
prove something to themselves‘) is the smallest of the five with only three members, all of whom 
are female. As a member of the only all-female grouping, Claudia‘s story offers a good contrast 
with Toni‘s, which is drawn from the most male-dominated of the groups with only two girls among 
its eight members, and so gives a sense of the versatility and the possibilities of my approach. 
In the mathematics education literature it is commonly argued that the masculinity of mathematics 
makes it more problematic for girls and women to choose and succeed at the subject than for boys 
and men. However, my aim here is to use this unusual theoretical approach, of seeing doing 
mathematics as doing masculinity, whether the doer is male or female, to imbue this idea with new 
meanings and understandings and to look at what these might have to say about changing gender 
and mathematics through education. Thus, before turning to Toni and Claudia‘s stories I explain the 
differences between my own approach to the question and others in the literature. 
 Differing lenses on ‘the problem of girls and mathematics’ 
Explanations of the gender imbalance in participation in mathematics are usually split into two 
categories—biological and sociological—with these being seen as directly opposed (Dunne & 
Johnston, 1994). In contrast, I argue here that they share some key assumptions about gender and, in 
particular, the ways in which the relationships between the terms in the following interlinked 
oppositions are imagined: 
● Biological/social. 
● Individual/social. 
● Gender/sex. 
● Masculine/feminine. 
Alongside this, I develop my alternative post-structuralist approach showing how differently it 
imagines these relationships. Biological explanations are generally based on average gender 
differences in measures of ‗spatial and mathematical abilities‘ or in measures of self-esteem, 
confidence and anxiety. These data are then theorised using arguments from evolutionary 
psychology. The problems with biological explanations are well rehearsed. I mention just two 
points that are central to my argument. First, within such arguments biology exists as a category that 
can be separated from social processes. However, biology always functions in a social context and 
is unthinkable outside it (Fausto- Sterling, 1985; Connell, 1987; Caplan et al., 1997; Boler, 1999). 
Second, within such arguments individuals are also viewed as separable from sociocultural 
practices. This had particularly damaging consequences when applied to explanations based in 
female lack of self-esteem, confidence, and so on, where the psychological approach meant that 
researchers ‗had ―no idea‖ how this might arise-these characteristics were, it seems, a corollary to 
being born female‘ (Willis, 1995, p. 189). Thus, these arguments construct ‗the problem of girls and 
mathematics‘ as residing within the girls (for critiques see Kenway & Willis, 1990; Chetcuti & 
Griffiths, 2002). It is in an attempt to avoid this that I, like many others, have turned to sociological 
explanations. 
Feminist researchers have generated a large number of sociological explanations for the male 
dominance of education generally, and of mathematics in particular. The main ones are lack of 
female role-models, widespread gender stereotyping, boys‘ dominance of educational spaces, sexual 
harassment in educational institutions, the gendered nature of knowledge, and gendered preferences 
for different teaching, learning and assessment styles. Theoretically these are based in the idea that 
boys and girls have different experiences and so develop different ‗abilities‘ and interests via a 
process of sex-role socialisation. In this way, it is argued, sex, the biological difference between 
men and women, is detached from gender, the sociological difference, so making change possible. 
The sex/gender distinction works with an idea of the interaction of the biological and the social in 
the construction of individuals. This raises many questions, such as: What is it that is supposed to be 
interacting? (Birke, 1999) And, where are these interactions taking place? (Blackman, 2001) The 
problem is that the ‗model of interaction (however complex an interaction is asserted) leaves the 
idea of an unmediated biology unchallenged‘ (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 21) and so results in 
basically the same construction of the biological/social dualism as operates in biological 
explanations. This forecloses possibilities of building new understandings of the role of biology in 
making us who we are. 
However, I do not want to replace the model of the interaction of the biological and the social with 
a social constructionist position that dismisses biology altogether, engaging with it only to critique 
its reductionism. With Blackman (2001, p. 211), I am concerned that ‗what is often overlooked is 
that ―biology‖ as an object, shifts and changes in meaning and cannot pass as a stable, constant 
category, which we can simply reject‘, and so the biological/social dualism remains intact and we 
delegate to biology all discussions of what goes on beyond the surface of the body except for that 
small portion claimed by psychoanalysis (Birke, 1999). Instead I view biological and psychological 
processes ‗as generative potentialities, which can be transformed through the strategies and 
practices we develop to identify and act upon these processes‘ (Blackman, 2001, p. 226). 
This is a post-structuralist approach to the body. Regarding post-structuralist approaches to the 
relationship between the individual and the social, it is useful to compare these with sex-role 
socialisation, the process by which sexed individuals are thought to take on social gender. 
Within the sex-role socialisation model of the world the child is taught her or his sex-role by, 
usually, one central adult, but is also ‗pressed‘ into maintenance of that role by a multitude of 
others (peers, media etc.). There is no room in this model for the child as active agent, the child 
as theorist, recognising for him or herself the way the social world is organised. Nor is there 
acknowledgement of the child as implicated in the construction and maintenance of the social 
world through the very act of recognising it and through learning its discursive practices. 
(Davies, 1989, p. 5) 
The child is positioned as passive, as acted on, within the story of their socialisation. Moreover 
there is a simple model of cause and effect operating in which certain aspects of the social world are 
seen to be directly causing gendered behaviours in children (Henriques et al., 1984; Connell, 1987; 
Walkerdine, 1998). Again the individual is imagined as essentially distinct from the social. 
Post-structuralism makes no such distinctions, instead referring to the process by which the child 
actively takes up their place within socio-cultural discourses as subjectification rather than 
socialisation (Davies, 1993). It was because I wanted to examine the ways in which people write 
themselves/are written in and through socio-cultural discourses that I used a narrative approach to 
analysing my data. Discourses are ‗practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak‘ (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). These knowledges about objects are powerful because they 
determine what can be said, as well as who can say it, and even what can be thought or imagined. 
Thus, these discourses are seen as operating within regimes of truth, not because of their power to 
describe reality, but because of their power to produce it. Central to post-structuralist conceptions of 
the self is the process of subjectification through which people take up positions in discourses. 
Discursive practices are imagined as negative and positive, oppressive and productive, 
simultaneously and always. 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think 
one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the 
fact that it doesn‘t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which 
runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 119) 
Thus power is exercised locally and wherever there is power there is also resistance. This idea 
captures the double-edgedness of power and is the basis of a conceptualisation of agency (see 
Butler, 1993). The notion that ‗oppressive‘ discursive positionings carry immense pleasure and 
power for the individuals occupying them is central to my readings of Toni and Claudia‘s 
investments in femininity, mathematics, and other discursive practices. Summarising, it is within a 
range of discourses on mathematics, masculinity, femininity, education and much more that an 
individual‘s educational choices and experiences come into being. So instead of asking ‗Why do 
girls/boys engage in specific practices?‘, the question is reversed to ask ‗How do specific practices 
do girls/boys?‘ (Flax, 2002). Masculinity and femininity are viewed as fluid properties of practices 
not people. ‗Gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to 
preexist the deed‘ for ‗there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ―expressions‖ that are said to be its results‘ (Butler, 1999, p. 
33). Female-ness and male-ness are produced through reiterative performances, in such a way that 
they appear to precede these performances, and so are experienced as authentic/natural by the 
performer/ possessor. Importantly, if sex and gender are seen as independent, then, even if a binary 
form of sex is assumed, there is no necessary reason why there should be only two genders nor why 
male bodies should become gendered as masculine and female bodies as feminine (Butler, 1999). 
These ideas amount to a radical transformation of the relations between the biological, the social 
and the individual in making-up gendered people. To demonstrate their value I use them to 
understand Toni and Claudia‘s mathematical choices and experiences. 
Toni’s story 
Toni was ‗born here [England]. But then I moved to America when I was like five. So I came back 
in June and my mum is from Africa, in Gambia. My dad is half Jamaican … my mum is half 
Nigerian and half Gambian‘. Her father died nine years ago and her mother is a flight attendant. 
Toni is studying biology, chemistry, and mathematics. She chose these because of her desire to be a 
doctor. 
I just like curing people [and] prescribing things, you know. Telling them: ‗take this and you‘ll feel 
better!‘ … Basically I just wanna be the person that knows everything. Like when you‘re sick yeah, I 
wanna be the one to tell you that ‗OK take this thing yeah and when you take it you‘ll feel better and 
stuff.‘ I just like, just helping people I guess … And I like working with kids also. 
Toni mentions several reasons for wanting to be a doctor in this passage but her desire to control 
others comes first, is stated with greater force and enthusiasm, and seems to be her central reason; 
the traditional feminine roles of helping others and caring for children appear to be added as 
afterthoughts. She wants the status, respect and influence that come with medical qualifications. 
Similar motivations are present in her relationship with mathematics. Toni has little to say about a 
typical mathematics lesson, she mentions only the length of the lesson and her grades: ‗It was great. 
Besides the timing was really short. I mean it was really quick. You know that was the only thing. 
But it was all right. I mean I had good grades anyway so, I was OK‘. One way that Toni uses 
mathematics to position herself as powerful is through obtaining good grades. Within the interview 
she displays a strong orientation around getting the qualifications necessary for her future plans. 
This is the reason that she gives for studying in England rather than America: ‗When you have like 
your … certificate that you get for taking your AS, it‘s really good when you go back to America 
because you can easily get a university … That‘s why I‘m here‘. 
However, it is not just the good grades Toni gets that enable her to use mathematics to feel 
powerful. That she is using the status of mathematics as a signifier of intelligence is evident in the 
discussion of what other people, not doing mathematics, think of the subject: ‗they think maths is so 
hard. And whoever‘s doing maths is so brainy. That‘s what everybody thinks‘. We then go on to talk 
about subject stereotypes more generally and I ask from where she thinks they come: 
OK someone like me I‘ll go and I‘ll be, ‗I want to be so smart‘ or ‗I want them to think that I‘m so 
smart‘ and I‘ll go ‗Oh my god, maths was so hard! You should see, look at this x, x, x .‘ Just to make 
them think that I‘m so smart you know. And then they‘ll be like ‗oh my god she‘s smart‘ you know, 
something like that. 
Toni‘s recognition of the power of mathematics is coupled with scepticism about the subject‘s 
utility. In the interview she asks ‗What‘s the use of maths?‘, explaining: 
when you graduate or when you get a job, nobody‘s gonna come into your office and tell you: ‗can [you] 
solve x square minus you know?‘ … It really doesn‘t make sense to me. I mean it‘s good we‘re doing it. 
It helps you to like crack your brain, think more and you know, and all those things. But like, nobody 
comes [to] see you and say ‗can [you] solve this?‘ 
So Toni‘s attachment to mathematics is related to her desires to have power over others, to be 
thought intelligent by them and to build her future relationship with the labour market. In other 
words, very similar to those of the boys in her group—Simon, James and Michael. In their cases I 
have no problems reading such a pattern of identifications as part of their masculine identity 
projects, but I have more difficulties and discomforts in Toni‘s case because she ‗is‘ female. In order 
to make sense of how masculine performances are affected by living on the female side of the 
gender binary, I borrow the term ‗gender category maintenance work‘ from Davies (1989, p. 29). 
Davies devises this concept to make sense of children‘s actions, including ‗what adults often see as 
incomprehensible nastiness on the part of small children‘, to maintain the categories of male and 
female against deviancy and to confirm the social competence of those doing it. She explains their 
thought processes running: 
I may feel sorry for you, I may even have a fascination with the way you are doing your masculinity [or 
femininity], but my aggression is essential in defining what you do as a transgression and clarifying for 
myself that I have got it right. One might say that the ‗deviants‘ are necessary for making stronger 
boundaries. Thus deviation does not change the category, but is used as an opportunity to shore the 
category up. (Davies, 1989, p. 29) 
My use here is a little different from (but in the spirit of) Davies‘ in that I apply the term to adults‘ 
(as well as to children‘s) behaviours and think of it as applying to the policing of one‘s own actions 
as well as to those of others. For example, there is evidence that people who make non-gender 
traditional subject choices, in general, have more conservative views on other aspects of gender 
roles (Thomas, 1990; Whitehead, 1996), as if their gender category maintenance work demands 
such conformity to compensate for their ‗transgressions‘ in other areas. In the rest of Toni‘s story, I 
want to consider how she compensates for the gender transgression of doing mathematics and so to 
explore the tensions between doing masculinity and ‗being‘ female. I do this by looking at her 
contradictory experiences of femininity. 
Toni tells me: 
Sometimes I wish that I was a boy … Coz you know why? Boys are really easy going … Basically I say 
that because like, girls are really, they take too much time first off, like making their nails doing their 
hair … If I was going to a party tonight, I would‘ve been planning it since last week or even last month 
talking about ‗oh what dress shall I buy, you know that silver one,‘ or talking about ‗oh my nails, my 
hair.‘ You know, boys just cut their hair, take some trousers, any kind of trousers, some nice shirt, it 
don‘t even have to be nice, some full shoes, and they are gone. Nothing else. Nothing else. But us it‘s 
just too much work. 
Toni describes the huge amount of time she devotes daily to getting ready for college. She finds this 
draining and in the next passage she questions its necessity, although she also feels obliged to 
continue. 
If you think about it, there‘s no point to it, because like, OK you just want to feel good, you know. But 
it‘s not like you coming to school to attract anybody. So somehow it doesn‘t make any sense, you taking 
your time dressing, but you know, trying to look good. But in some other way, you‘re trying to just feel 
good about yourself. So it‘s really different. It‘s two different things. People dress for boys, some girls, 
and some girls just dress because they feel like dressing that way and some people just wanna look 
good. But some people say, ‗oh she ain‘t got no money‘ or something like that ‗she‘s poor‘ or something. 
Toni‘s views are reminiscent of those of the white working-class female students in Skeggs‘ (1997) 
research, who found their physical presentation proscribed by the powerful notion of 
‗respectability‘. 
They operate with a dialogic form of recognition: they recognize the recognitions of others. 
Recognitions do not occur without value judgements of real and imaginary others. Recognition of how 
one is positioned is central to the processes of subjective construction. (Skeggs, 1997, p. 4; original 
emphasis) 
Along with one of Skeggs‘ participants, Toni evokes ‗a sense of being caught up in something 
which is beyond her control‘; the risks of getting out are too great, hazarding ‗cultural 
stigmatisations in her local situation; a challenge to all her friends who collude in femininity; a sign 
of difference‘ (Skeggs, 1997, p. 102). In this discussion I argue that, while being masculine carries 
an appeal for Toni, she is also (understandably) heavily invested in producing herself as female, 
both in her own eyes and in other people‘s. In order to do this she draws on the discursive practices 
that produce people as masculine or feminine. The tension in these passages between wanting to 
dress recklessly like a man and wanting to be recognised through her dress as a woman, suggest that 
we could understand there being similar tensions contained in her desire, discussed earlier, for 
masculine control and mathematical success within education and employment, and her desire to be 
recognised through her actions in these fields as a woman. Thus, while Toni‘s desire for and envy of 
masculinity are tangible, there are conflicts with the demands placed on her to maintain her position 
within the category ‗woman‘. Among other things these tensions and conflicts make it more 
difficult for her to consistently and comfortably inhabit a position as mathematically successful. I 
continue my exploration of the tensions that are experienced by young women studying 
mathematics in Claudia‘s story. 
Claudia’s story 
Claudia, an ambitious young woman, is interested in becoming a barrister. Her family moved from 
Algeria to Scotland when she was four years old, and then later to London. In her interview she 
distances herself from her childhood; for example, through her absence from the phrases ‗my mum 
and dad are from Algeria‘ and ‗they lived there till I was four and a half‘. She is studying five 
subjects, instead of the usual four, but ‗if you could do six, I‘d be doing six‘ because ‗I don‘t feel 
alright, if I‘m not doing, if I know I‘m not doing the hardest thing possible, I‘m not really exerting 
myself, I don‘t like it‘. Her subject choices—chemistry, English literature, French, history and 
mathematics—cut across the academic curriculum. They represent Claudia‘s desire for challenge as 
well as her self-presentation as sophisticated (she prefers to sit at the back of the class and is 
disdainful of those eager to answer questions), ‗defiant‘ (‗I don‘t [take] things as they‘re told to 
me‘) and determined. She also jokingly describes her programme of study as ‗self-torture‘, 
suggesting that it is associated with pain, as it is for the middle-class women in Walkerdine et al. 
(2001, p. 179) whose ‗educational lives had been rigidly circumscribed by the expectations of 
academic success, often to such an extent that quite outstanding performances were only ever 
viewed as average and ordinary‘. This ambiguity can be read in Claudia‘s subject choices. With 
French she clearly wanted a challenge: ‗I went to France last year, in the summer sorry, and I 
realised I wasn‘t quite as good at French as I always thought I was, so I thought I should take it up‘. 
She is trying to prove that she is as good at French as she thought she was and clearly thinks she 
should be. However, because Claudia keeps raising her academic targets, I doubt she will ever be 
able to do enough to prove herself to herself. Thus, this continual challenge seeking may be both 
destructive and productive. This double edged-ness is clearer in her talk about mathematics. 
Claudia employs a militarist metaphor to explain her choice of mathematics: ‗I like the fact that I‘ve 
got to conquer these numbers‘. However, as well as her evident pleasure in the power she gets from 
such conquests, she explains: 
sometimes I dread going into [maths], ‗oh now I‘ve got maths‘ but I think that‘s just because of the … 
stigma attached to maths. It‘s like, ‗oh, maths, numbers, er‘. I don‘t dislike it. It‘s not my favourite 
subject. I‘m doing it, I‘m doing maths sort of because I know it will be a challenge to me and it‘s useful 
and it‘s good, I think it‘s good for your brain to do maths. 
These painful aspects of Claudia‘s mathematical identifications are also manifest in the way she 
froze in her GCSE examination: ‗I was so scared of not having done enough maths revision‘, so 
when ‗I went into the exam for the first few minutes I was just really scared stiff, I couldn‘t do 
anything. I just kept staring at the first page and just reading it and not taking it in at all‘. 
In explaining Claudia‘s ‗dread‘, her account of being sent, aged 12, to special mathematics classes 
is important. 
I was like always top in the class, top in the year, and … myself and a couple of other students were 
selected from the year to go to these advanced maths classes … And they were really, really hard. [The 
classes covered] really super, super maths for really clever people … and so me and my friend would 
just sit there and sort of draw, doodling and so, I think, there‘s often been times when I‘ve like been 
inclined to be scared of maths coz of not understanding it. 
Claudia‘s fear relates both to the gendered myth of mathematical genius (Mendick, 2005) and to the 
constant threat of just ‗not understanding it‘, and so of being judged inadequate/wrong (Buxton, 
1981). 
Her experience of mathematics can be read as gendered in two further ways. First, she tells me that, 
while she has always been ‗good at mental arithmetic‘ and ‗just thinking in numbers comes quite 
naturally to me‘, she has problems with ‗harder maths‘. This distinction draws on the gendered 
discursive oppositions reason/calculation and hard/easy (Walkerdine, 1988, 1997). Second, despite 
negative feelings, she chose mathematics. The high-status intellectual challenge that mathematics 
represents is central to this, but so are her teachers. Claudia‘s version of mathematics is relational: 
‗[Mathematics] really depends on the person you have teaching you‘. She tells me that, in GCSE, 
‗the first teacher I had I didn‘t really gel with him so … I didn‘t feel I really achieved anything‘ but 
the following year a ‗really good‘ teacher took over. When I ask why this teacher was so good, 
Claudia hesitates then observes: 
[an] odd coincidence was that the teacher who I had for [ages 11–14] was a lady, and the teacher who I 
found to be good was also a lady … I think it was … the way she treated us, the way she spoke to us, 
especially like my little group … it was more personal. 
However, despite this, Claudia is reluctant to read the influence of gender into her educational 
choices. After she has talked briefly about possible physiological and sociological reasons for the 
gendering of subject choice, I ask about the general impact of gender on her life. In contrast to Toni, 
Claudia says nothing about how she inhabits her femininity. Instead she explains: 
I read something about if you‘re a barrister, female barrister, you have to accept that men will go further 
than you, which I think is a bit ‗er, no they won‘t!‘ I want to be the best‘. [We laugh.] Obviously men 
still get better pay, don‘t they? Erm, I don‘t know, I‘m not really a feminist. I don‘t think that, I don‘t 
know all about that equality thingy and stuff … I think if you‘re male then you have more of a chance of 
being more career orientated and even if you‘re not career orientated, coz well women produce children, 
funnily enough, um it‘s sort of split between the two. So men are more likely to become leaders and 
more important people, have more jobs, and so it becomes a man‘s world really. And women are still um 
second-class. I mean I‘ve heard that said a lot but I don‘t know how true it is … It‘s becoming less and 
less true, but I think it is, it is true in sort of, in terms of the hard facts it is. Like figures and stuff. Who 
has what jobs, who earns what, who owns what, who has power, stuff. 
Claudia‘s account of choices free from constraints can be disrupted by reading it in the context of 
Rose‘s (1999, p. ix) discussion of neo-liberalism‘s insistence that ‗each individual must render his 
or her life meaningful as if it were the outcome of individual choices made in furtherance of a 
biographical project of self-realization‘. These new forms of regulation can neither be understood as 
freedom, since ‗the self is not merely enabled to choose, but obliged to construe a life in terms of its 
choices‘ (Rose, 1999, p. 231), nor as repression since they ‗do not crush subjectivity. They actually 
fabricate subjects-human men, women and children-capable of bearing the burdens of liberty‘ (p. 
vii). Claudia is reading herself through this fiction of the autonomous self (Walkerdine et al., 2001) 
that compels her resistance to connecting being female to lacking power and to disadvantage within 
her own life. Instead she attaches these to generalised others and to the impersonal realm of reports, 
statistics and theories. Although it is through this fiction that Claudia‘s desire to succeed at 
mathematics and as a barrister is constituted, it is one that carries more tensions for girls than for 
boys: 
Now that girls can, in principle, take the place previously accorded to their brothers, their production as 
the bourgeois subject is a huge struggle and is never simply or entirely achieved, and certainly not 
without terrible penalties for body and mind. This view of what happens to the girls is in complete 
opposition to a simplistic notion of a genderquake as a freeing feminist triumph! (Walkerdine et al., 
2001, p. 175) 
I would argue that these tensions are particularly pronounced in the case of mathematics because of 
its key role in producing rational subjects and the gendered ways that it is constructed as absolute 
and abstract, and so as dis-embodied and disconnected. Before looking at possible interventions into 
these constructions, I draw together my analyses of Toni and Claudia. 
Endings 1: connecting Toni and Claudia 
Toni and Claudia show us how they use/are used by their educational choices to do their identity 
work. Mathematics is a powerful choice because its discursive construction allows it to function in 
their identity projects as a way of proving their ‗abilities‘ to a range of imagined others, and to 
themselves. Taking a post-structuralist approach, the power of mathematics and hence its authority 
in saying something about oneself, is not something fixed and natural, but is a contingent product of 
the discourses through which it is constituted. Within the discourses that are central to the way that 
Toni, Claudia and my other participants negotiate a relationship with the subject, mathematics is 
different from other subjects; it is certain, challenging, hard, and unrelated to everyday life. 
Mathematicians are different from other people; they combine the flattering character of geniuses 
and heroes with the unflattering character of ‗nerds‘ (Mendick, 2005). These discourses are 
oppositional and gendered; they inscribe mathematics as masculine, as do the discourses that relate 
mathematics to wage earning potential (McGavin, 1999) along with the continued gendering of 
participation in paid labour (Witz, 1997). Thus we can understand those engaged in the practices of 
mathematics as doing masculinities and so it is more difficult for girls and women to feel 
comfortable with mathematics, and so to succeed at and choose it. 
Thus, I have argued through Toni and Claudia‘s stories that doing mathematics creates tensions for 
them because, while mathematics is discursively inscribed as masculine, their bodies are 
discursively inscribed as feminine, and it is this latter label that they are invested in producing as 
‗natural‘. In the stories, the reasons that I offer for the gendering of the need to prove to yourself 
and others that you are good enough to do mathematics are based on a range of experiences—for 
example, of teachers, of friends and of bodies—that, in general, differ for girls and boys. I relate 
these to the way that, while both girls and boys are required to produce themselves as autonomous 
subjects, this is a process that is more problematic for girls than for boys. 
This argument avoids essentialist thinking on gender difference by seeing gender as 
a social practice rather than an individual trait, deconstructing the oppositions: 
● Biological/social. 
● Individual/social. 
● Gender/sex. 
These students‘ behaviours are gendered because different social contexts elicit different behaviours 
and men and women have differential exposure to these contexts, and so the system becomes self-
perpetuating (Bohan, 1997). In other words, both boys‘ and girls‘ subject choices represent attempts 
by young people to occupy powerful subject positions but their gender/identity projects make 
available different ways of being powerful. 
This argument also avoids oppositional thinking on gender difference queering the binary: 
● Masculine/feminine. 
I have broken with the dominant pattern of research in gender and mathematics education, and in 
the sociology of gender more generally, that maps masculinities onto men and boys and femininities 
onto women and girls (Halberstam, 1998) and so tacitly reinforces oppositional conceptions of 
gender. 
That people whose bodies are socially marked as feminine do things that are socially marked as 
masculine and vice versa is not surprising. However, that the marking of the body as male or female 
impacts on one‘s possibilities for acting is apparent in both Toni and Claudia‘s stories; not all 
positions are equally available to all people. Access to the available gendered subject positions is 
also cross-cut by differences of class, race/ethnicity, dis/ability and hetero/sexuality. Given the 
generally greater social valuation of facets of masculinity, it is not surprising that these hold out 
greater appeal for boys and girls than do facets of femininity. This has social justice implications. 
The analyses in this paper suggest that it is important to make a wider range of discursive 
positionings/stories available to a wider range of individuals. As Plummer (1995, p. 166) argued (in 
the rather different context of sexualities): ‗It is not an easy option to keep the pluralistic, polyvocal 
potential of proliferating stories open; but it is probably a very necessary one‘. I end with a brief 
look at the implications of this for gender and for mathematics reform work. 
Endings 2: changing gender and mathematics 
In a rare study of female masculinity, Halberstam (1998) points out that, while it may be easier to be 
a tomboy than a sissy, this does not carry through into adulthood. She argues that, while ‗excessive 
conventional femininity often associated with female heterosexuality can be bad for your health‘ 
and ‗tends to be associated with passivity and inactivity, [and] with various forms of unhealthy body 
manipulations from anorexia to high-heeled shoes‘ (Halberstam, 1998, p. 268), it is masculinity that 
is commonly viewed as dangerous for women and girls. There is a need ‗to make masculinity safe‘ 
for us: 
Although it seems counter-intuitive to suggest that such a project should be necessary in the 1990s, it 
has been my contention that despite at least two decades of sustained feminist and queer attacks on the 
notion of natural gender, we still believe that masculinity in girls and women is abhorrent and 
pathological. (Halberstam, 1998, p. 268) 
However, femininity and masculinity are not two symmetric sets of practices from which people 
should be enabled to select at will. Current gender regimes are profoundly unequal and men still 
secure their ‗patriarchal dividend‘ (Connell, 1995). I see the project of making masculinity safe for 
women (and femininity safe for men) as a way of transforming the practices and ways of being that 
currently support the oppression of women. After all, it is the exclusion of women (and men) from 
certain practices that allows them to function as part of a system of domination. So, the question is: 
how can mathematics teachers engage in this project of making masculinity safe for women and 
girls? One way is to acknowledge the problem and create spaces in which to talk about it. Damarin 
(2000) follows this route when she suggests setting up support groups similar to Alcoholics 
Anonymous for budding female mathematicians. 
However, this option leaves mathematics itself unchanged. This is unacceptable since, if doing 
mathematics is doing masculinity, mathematical practices are implicated in preserving male 
domination. So mathematics must change and the starting point must be the myth of the certainty of 
mathematical knowledge, its epistemological status as absolute and untainted by the corruption and 
messiness of daily life. This gives mathematics its power and maintains it in its position as the 
ultimate intelligence test. However, it is an entrenched myth and one that makes it difficult to put 
alternative epistemologies into practice in the classroom. In order to point ways forward I use the 
two metaphors: voice and narrative. By basing my analysis around students‘ voices and stories, the 
‗objective‘ voice of mathematics has been put in its place allowing other voices to be heard. It is 
important to avoid essentialism here; there are no true voices. However, the idea of ‗voice‘ is still 
useful. It enables me to acknowledge that we feel able to express some things in some places but 
not in others and that some of these processes feel authentic while some feel like silencing, and that 
these processes impact on what we can do in different spaces. I would suggest that allowing more 
voices into classrooms would mean teachers and students engaging with mathematics that is about 
more than right (and wrong) answers. It would mean adopting pedagogical practices that value the 
process of doing mathematics over the results obtained; ones in which students talk about different 
approaches to the same problem, debate the merits of different ‗solutions‘ to the same problem, and 
see teachers and each other making mistakes and so learn to view these as part of mathematics 
rather than shameful things to be concealed (Hall, 2004). 
However, hearing voices is not a neutral process. As the analytic work here illustrates, it is not 
enough to change practices so as to introduce more voices, it matters into which stories we insert 
the words we hear. Bibby (2001, p. 27) argues that ‗school mathematics still lacks stories‘ and asks 
‗Is this one reason why some of us have such trouble understanding and relating to it?‘ I both 
disagree and agree with this. I disagree because, as this paper illustrates, there are stories about 
mathematics; to make meaning in any field, including mathematics, is to tell stories. I agree in the 
sense that these stories, for example, of mathematics as absolute and of mathematical ‗ability‘ as 
natural, are of a very particular kind and are ones that create limited spaces for learners (and 
teachers). 
Mathematical pedagogies, as my research has done, should actively work to embrace a wider range 
of stories through which to make sense of the cacophony of student voices. This means teachers 
engaging in the interlocking projects of changing their practices and their ideas about what 
mathematics is and how it can best be learnt. (Although this is something that is far from easy in the 
current examination and targetdriven educational system.) Many others have called for similar 
changes to mathematics (Skovsmose, 1994; Burton, 1996; Cotton, 2001; Boaler, 2002). My work 
supports their arguments that this would be a more inclusive and socially just curriculum than the 
current one. One in which more students than at present could come to think of themselves as what 
Povey calls author/ities in relation to mathematics: 
An author is one who brings things into being. Who is the originator of any action or state of 
things. Authority is concerned with power and the validity of knowledge. Linked together 
they lead us to the construction of an epistemology which recognises each of us as the 
originator of knowledge. (1997, p. 332) 
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